A Case for Increasing Singapore’s Participation in International Peacekeeping
‘Military Operations Other Than War’ (MOOTW), also known as ‘Peace Support Operations’ (PSO)[1] encompasses operations that have been described by the United Nations’ ‘Supplement to an Agenda for Peace’[2] as ‘Instruments for Peace and Security’ that involve elements such as ‘peace-keeping’, ‘post-conflict peace-building’, and ‘preventive diplomacy and peacemaking’[3]. This article aims to argue that Singapore should increase its participation in such multilateral operations under international bodies such as the UN. The main arguments will include the valuable combat experience the Singapore Armed Forces (SAF) could gain, the improvement in international standing Singapore potentially receives from participation of such missions and our reliance on international bodies as a small nation, and lastly, the necessity of stability on the region. Although there are several branches this argument can apply to, such as the Singapore Police Force and Singapore Civil Defence Force, the former of which has seen multiple deployments under the United Nations as Peacekeepers[4], this essay will remain focused predominantly on the Singapore Armed Forces. Although it is widely recognised that all branches contribute in no small way to Singapore’s defence and are integral parts of the Republic’s Total Defence doctrine[5], the spotlight placed on the Singapore Armed Forces is due to the far larger availability in firepower and its traditional and predominant role as Singapore’s first and foremost national deterrence against conventional enemies of the state and external influence[6].
Singapore has, fortunately, had little opportunity to gain combat experience since its independence in 1965. The closest to hostilities Singapore had ever experienced was the McDonald House Bombing on the 10th of March 1965 and the Konfrontasi period in general[7]. Whilst still a part of Malaysia, the First and Second Singapore Infantry Regiments (1SIR and 2SIR) took part in combat and experienced the brutality of then-unrefined COIN operations against Indonesian ‘saboteurs’[8]. However, whatever action the 1SIR and 2SIR had experienced had occurred some 54 years ago from today[9], and the SAF as we know it had since adopted a doctrine of conventional warfare as a form of deterrence from conventional states that has threatened the Republic’s existence since its independence[10].
Thus far, there has been one occasion noteworthy whereby the Singapore Armed Forces have engaged in live combat. Operation Thunderbolt involved the well-known hijacking of Singapore Airlines flight SQ117 in 1991, whereby Singapore’s then-secret Special Operations Forces (SOF) stormed the hijacked aircraft and swiftly neutralised the onboard threats, resulting in mission success and the safety of all hostages onboard[11].
However, one incident, for a single unit of the SAF, would not provide sufficient combat experience or data that would allow Singapore to alter her defence and security policy when it comes to training, tactics and equipment for every branch of the entire organisation that is the Armed Forces, though it undoubtably shed light on lessons for SOF and small unit tactics and operations in CQB. It would be bordering ridiculousness to say those same lessons learnt through the hijacking, as enlightening as they may be and useful for units executing close-quarter battle in dense urban terrain, would be equally applicable or useful to Singapore’s modern Leopard 2SG crews, the pilot of an F-35, or a commander ordered to defend a number tactical hardpoints in an area of operations (AO).
The argument may be made that combat experience may not be an end-all-be-all since Operation Thunderbolt was a success despite the SAF’s lack of it. To that, it can be retorted that to dismiss the importance of combat experience would be to take the SAF’s abilities for granted. Thunderbolt was but a single operation that took place decades ago – the operating environment, equipment and modus operandi of Singapore’s potential enemies have changed, and the SAF[12] needs to adapt.
Apart from a declaration of war, there seems little in ways a nation’s military could possibly gain combat experience for itself. One method, however, would be participation in a MOOTW, particularly, Combat Peacekeeping, as the SAF did in Timor Leste with Operation Blue Heron in 1999[13] and Operation Blue Ridge in 2007 to 2013[14]. Although no official records exist that the deployed SAF were engaged in combat in either operation, at the very least, it gained invaluable multilateral mission experience, and at the very most, gained operational experience with equipment and support tactics including drone usage and counter-battery detection[15].
This leads on to another possible argument that can be posed would be how PKFs rarely get engaged in combat. This could even be prima facie evident with SAF’s deployment in both Blue Heron and Blue Ridge. Furthermore, this appears to be the mindset of majority of people, and their unhappiness and dissatisfaction with the UN PKOs in general, especially when PKFs were ordered to stand down when civilians were in danger, failing to protect them[16].
A fine example of Peacekeepers taking both initiative and action can stem from the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) combined Scandinavian mechanised battalion NORDBAT 2. Deployed to Bosnia in 1993, a Swedish platoon of the detachment was ordered to surrender three Muslim nurses over to Croatian battalion. Despite being vastly outnumbered, the Swedes endured a barrage of mortar fire and still refused to comply, ready to engage a numerically superior foe in order to discharge their duties as Peacekeepers (though the Croatians eventually left)[17]. Another incident saw NORDBAT 2 ambushed by Bosnian-Serb forces, and the Scandinavians retaliated fiercely, with their Leopard 1 tanks expanding a total of 72 main gun rounds during the engagement, resulting approximately 150 Bosnian Serbs killed[18].
Since 1993 and the Peacekeeping mission to the former Yugoslavia, however, per the United Nation’s guidelines for Use of Force by Military Components in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations has since changed – the Rules of Engagement (ROE) and authorised use of force in peace enforcement has since been changed since 2017, and allows for far more lethal and/or kinetic reactions to ensure the safety of civilians and the PKF themselves[19], opposed to the traditional requirement that PKFs may only fire if fired upon, and often to the ire of UN command[20].
A final note on the merits of the SAF gaining combat experience would be its effect on its domestic arms and equipment development. An extremely recent example[21] of this would be how the Russian experience in Syria had reportedly both helped to develop and field test a prototype exoskeleton named ‘Штурмови́к’ (Shturmovik) for combat application[22].
Diplomatically, Singapore can only gain from participating in PKO, HADR, and such multilateral missions – namely, its standing in the international community. Many sources have agreed that small states and nations, such as Singapore, need to rely on international organisations[23] [24]. Doing so will prevent the voices of small states from being drowned out in the global stage, as ASEAN has proven[25]. However, ASEAN, as it stands today, is based on a strict policy of non-interference[26]. Although HADR does not pose much issue, combat peacekeeping operations are not as readily welcomed as humanitarian aid for obvious reasons. As such, this leaves the United Nations as one of the foremost, legitimate, and non-partisan international body, capable of granting mandates for combat peacekeeping missions.
As much as Singapore and small states rely on larger international bodies such as the United Nations, so too must Singapore prove its membership in such an organisation as an indispensable member. Taking part in PKOs and HADRs under the United Nations serves only to improve Singapore’s diplomatic standing, as well as to show Singapore’s commitment to peacekeeping as well as multinational cooperation.
There is, however, a sound argument that can be made against this point – namely, the absolute necessity for the SAF to defend Singapore’s national interest first and foremost. There is some merit to this argument. Singapore, as of 2020, maintains a total manpower strength of approximately 385,000[27]. Malaysia and Indonesia can potentially deploy 410,000[28] and 800,000[29] respectively. As an added threat, the infamous 1991 joint Indonesian-Malaysian exercise codenamed Pukul Habis (Total Wipeout) was a thinly veiled message to Singapore of the two nation’s ability to cooperate against the small island republic[30]. Mathematically speaking, that would pit Singapore’s 385,000 against 1,210,000 potential troops (although given Indonesia’s geography, far less than the full 800,000 would likely be deployed, and of those 800,000, it should be noted that half are considered by analysts and experts to be ‘poor’ quality reservists[31]).
Furthermore, the two countries have not always had the friendliest relationship with Singapore and are considered the Republic’s closest threats – Malaysia as the primary, and Indonesia as a secondary. Though relationships were strained multiple times in the 1990s[32], but could reasonably be considered cooled until tensions once again reignited when Mahathir took power and ordered Malaysian naval vessels to intrude into Singapore waters in 2019[33]. Singapore’s relationship with Indonesia, however, may be considered much more cordial as the years passed[34], including celebrating RISING50 (Republic of Indonesia, SINGapore, 50) in 2017 as a celebration of 50 years of military ties and diplomatic friendship[35]. However, despite the arguably friendly relations three countries share today, there still remains the threat of conflict breaking out, should history be considered.
There are several counterarguments that this essay will provide regarding the matter of Singapore losing its ‘strategic edge’ against its two most probable enemies should hostilities break out, and its national defence being ‘blunted’, by reducing its already comparatively small manpower pool to UN PKOs and HADRs. The first would be the fact that Singapore does not need to send a large contingent to participate in OOTWs. The second is Singapore’s technological edge over Malaysia and Indonesia[36], and lastly, the signal Singapore is sending the international and regional communities by participating in MOOTWs.
A direct counterargument to the concerns raised regarding the blunting of the SAF’s manpower pool would be that the force sent on HADR and PKOs needn’t be exceptionally large. This essay earlier mentioned the need for invaluable combat experience and argues Operation Thunderbolt’s invalidity owing to its scale and limited applicability. Though true, combat experience is most valuable when it is gained by key members in the SAF’s organisational structure – mainly command staff. Though there is ample merit from NCOs, junior officers, and even enlisted men or women from gaining combat experience, as they could easily become trainers or instructors, the effects and knowledge gained from combat would be most efficiently distributed and utilised by leadership positions, to be very specific, in the form of battalion commanders. There are several reasons for this.
Firstly, a combat battalion would be the ideal unit strength to deploy on a combat PKO, exemplified by NORDBAT 2 (although it must be noted that NORDBAT 2 comprises of different detachments from different Scandinavian nations)[37]. An SAF battalion contains all the necessary elements to successfully conduct combat operations, and thus would ideally maintain its organisation and structure, apart from mission necessities. Another possibility would be following in the footsteps of NORDBAT 2 and sending varying detachments with other ASEAN member states to form such a similar battalion, but the differing military cultures may affect efficiency in combat, and the lack of a guarantee that an SAF major would be in command may defeat the entire purpose of the PKO participation. After the deployment, the battalion commander would retain the lessons learnt as he or she advances up the command chain. With different experiences and lessons learnt from various deployments and types of deployment, as well as its application to different battalion types (armour, infantry, etc), the SAF would vastly increase its wealth of knowledge and evolve accordingly.
It should be mentioned that the SAF have already deployed for countless MOOTWs, most commonly in the form of HADR[38] and operational support in Afghanistan under Operation Blue Ridge[39],but Operation Blue Heron remains the sole combat PKO in public knowledge.
As for Singapore’s lethal technological advantage that would easily substitute the lack of numbers, the perfect example that demonstrates this point would be the number and type of military aircraft the two nations possess.
As shown, the Republic of Singapore Air Force (RSAF) maintains a larger and far more lethal arsenal than Malaysia or Indonesia. This theme is frequently echoed through almost all aspects of the Singapore Armed forces – from its small arms, organisation, and structure to its armoured capabilities and its naval power. Singapore simply has an irreplaceable technological edge over its neighbours[42], and therefore an overwhelming advantage in its force-multiplication and combat ability[43] should the unfortunate outbreak of hostilities occur.
Finally, there is the emotional and human diplomatic element. Commitment to PKO, HADR operations and other multilateral and internationally cooperative deployments will signal to the UN, ASEAN, and more importantly, our neighbours Malaysia and Indonesia, that Singapore is determined to ensure stability and peace is brought into unstable areas in the world. This would arguably ease the traditional tensions that have plagued the three nations since their formations, and possibly see new opportunities for cooperation in the future. Furthermore, as proven recently in the 2019 infringement by Malaysian vessels into Singaporean waters, Singapore had prioritised diplomacy or escalation or military intervention[44]. It is absolutely understandable that this last argument may constitute ‘wishful thinking’, as it involves placing the reliance of Singapore’s national security and interest in the trust of our two largest threats and hoping that Singapore’s dedication to peace and security is not viewed as a weakness and an opening to be exploited militarily or otherwise. This possibility has been taken into account, and thus, the emphasis once more on Singapore’s technological advantage and lethality of the smaller, albeit deadlier, military.
This leads us to the third point as to why Singapore should increase its participation in MOOTWs.
Singapore’s unique and precarious position in South East Asia has no doubt been echoed throughout the education system, with ample emphasis placed upon the dependence on Malaysia for Singapore’s water supply[45]. Despite the frequent calls by certain politicians to either rectify the 1962 water agreement[46] or to turn off the supply totally[47] as a form of sabre-rattling, or even going back to the nadir of tri-state relations with the 1991 Operation Pukul Habis[48], there has, fortunately, not been an outbreak of hostilities between the countries since the Konfrontasi period more than a half-century ago.
This peace in Southeast Asia can be credited to its regional stability, with international organisations such as ASEAN[49] soothing disputes between its members. However, owing to its strict policy of non-interference[50], there exists little options for smaller and vulnerable states to prevent a different form of ‘domino effect’, whereby instability in one region of a larger country may spread, and the status quo currently enjoyed may not be maintained if a radical actor takes hold. One example would be Marawi, whereby Islamic State (IS) affiliated groups, in a bid to establish a ‘wilyat’ (province) in Southeast Asia, reduced Marawi City in the Lanao del sur province of the Philippines into rubble battling Philippine security forces for months[51]. Though the ability of Islamic State Lanao (ISL) and Islamic State Philippines’ (ISP) to topple the government is completely unfeasible, it opens the door to the possibility of a terrorist hotbed in Southeast Asia[52]. Furthermore, there is also the possibility that, perhaps through a coup or through a large-scale uprising as seen in Marawi, a government may be toppled and replaced. Not necessarily by Islamic extremists, as in Marawi, but the possibility of a more nationalistic government, completely forgoing the sabre-rattling and instead, both eager and willing to deploy the military to threaten Singapore’s national security.
Although ASEAN is a strictly non-interference body, such a vast upset in the status quo will very likely draw the attention of the UN, and if not, the major powers in the world. It is through either of these means that Singapore may deploy in a combat peacekeeping role, as Singapore did in Blue Heron through the United Nations in Timor Leste or with the ISAF in Afghanistan.
Ultimately, the maintenance of regional stability, in its immediate geostrategic position as well as in the whole of Southeast Asia, is by all means another form of national defence. Furthermore, with the Battle of Marawi as well as the rise of IS in Southeast Asia, Singapore has since shifted its view from identifying conventional enemies as its most pressing threat to terrorism and non-state actors[53]. Singapore and Malaysia have frequently cooperated in this aspect[54], echoing Mahathir Mohamad’s words acknowledgement that the two countries had never once failed to cooperate in regard to ‘subversive and criminal elements’ in a 1981 interview.
The argument against Singapore participating in peacekeeping deployments to maintain regional stability, and perhaps the entire position this essay takes towards MOOTW as a whole, is best explained by Professor Ong Wei Chong in his 2011 article, Peripheral to Norm? The Expeditionary Role of the Third Generation Singapore Armed Forces: Singapore will not unnecessarily risk the lives of her sons[55]. To escalate the SAF’s role in MOOTWs and PKOs is to do exactly that – and there would undoubtably be immense political backlash should Singapore sustain casualties during such operations.
To this point, this essay will take a possibly controversial and undoubtably ‘cold’ stance on the issue: sacrifices must be made.
Ultimately, as this essay has pointed out, Singapore’s arsenal in defending its national security and interests are merely restricted to its military assets, but diplomatic as well. And should diplomacy fail, Singapore may leverage on its technology to achieve a lethal advantage over its adversaries. However, if Singapore should find itself in a state of war, the losses sustained, in both civilian and military deaths, let alone wounded or permanently disabled, would be astronomical. Singapore’s economic prosperity and domestic stability will be utterly destroyed. Compared to the exchange of sacrifices made by courageous peacekeepers, preventing such a state of war from occurring in the first place, the answer becomes obvious. Singapore and its citizens must understand that the sacrifice of a few may lead to the salvation of the population – even if the chain of events may seem far apart enough to lack any apparent correlation at the time.
The bottom line of this article is made here: combat experience and international standing are ultimately nothing compared to the tantamount importance that is regional stability, for survival of Singapore may be put to risk should such failure to maintain the status quo occur.This article has laid out the utmost importance of Singapore’s undertaking of OOTWs. Participating in combat Peacekeeping Operations would allow for the SAF to gain important combat and operational experience, while HADR operations will diplomatically benefit Singapore’s standing in the world stage. But ultimately, Singapore’s, and by that extension, the Singapore Armed Forces’, willing to maintaining regional stability would be the deciding factor in Singapore’s national security from a military perspective. There exist countless other factors outside the scope this article covers, such as the Singapore Police Force and its capabilities in mass urban terrorist attacks that preluded Marawi, but in a strictly military role and with the context of MOOTW, the SAF will need to encompass an increasing role as a multilateral and peacekeeping force in order to maintain its mission: to enhance Singapore’s peace and security through deterrence and diplomacy, and should these fail, to secure a swift and decisive victory over the aggressor[56].
[1] MOOTW was coined by the US while term PSO is more frequently used by the British.
[2] Segal, H., 2005. Geopolitical Integrity. Montreal [Que.]: IRPP, p.275.
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[9] At the time of writing, it is the year 2020 AD / BCE, should some future archivist find this.
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[12] Although the SAF is mentioned due to being the focus of the essay, the author believes this applies to all branches of Singapore’s services, including the SPF, SCDF, and even other branches such as the LTA, MHA, ISD, etc.
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[21] As of writing, the article was released two days ago, on the 1st of October 2020
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