[ The Irrawaddy ] Visions of a Federal Future for Myanmar are Fading Fast
In fact, the AA has been more assertive, not just in words but also in deeds. Since November 2020, when a ceasefire was tacitly agreed between the AA and the Myanmar military, the AA has carried out its ambitious plan to tighten its grip on Rakhine State. With the military occupied with suppressing resistance to their February 1 coup, the AA has strategically stepped up to institutionalize its de facto authority in Rakhine.
Although the AA’s main power base was previously in northern Rakhine, it quickly extended its sway to the south following the coup. Consequently, the AA is now believed to control over three-quarters of the entire state. Since the coup, the AA has made a handful of significant gains thanks to the junta’s policy of appeasing its once bitter enemy. The junta lifted the world’s longest internet shutdown in Rakhine State, delisted the AA as a terrorist organization and released Rakhine political prisoners, including prominent figures such as Dr. Aye Maung and the AA chief’s relatives. In return, Rakhine State has been somewhat quiet despite the intensive anti-coup resistance mounted in other parts of the country. AA chief Maj-Gen Tun Myat Naing even said that he does not want the pro-democratic Civil Disobedience Movement and street protests spreading to Rakhine State. Consequently, the AA has been accused by the Bamar majority, and even by some analysts, of collaborating with the junta.
The AA leader repudiated those allegations, claiming that the AA is unwaveringly implementing its own “way of Rakhita” – “the struggle for national liberation and the restoration of Arakan’s sovereignty to the people of Arakan”. He elaborated the AA’s current position by conceptually dividing the revolution into four stages – the initial stage, the revolutionary stage, the rivalry stage and the conquest stage – and by placing the current struggle of the AA in the third stage.
In a bold attempt to vie with the junta’s power, the AA issued a stay-at-home order to control the COVID-19 outbreak in Rakhine State. Around 75% of Rakhine residents, according to AA officials, have complied with that order, which demonstrates the AA’s powerful influence on the Rakhine people. The AA went a step further by establishing its own administrative mechanism and, recently, judiciary in Rakhine. So far, the military has refrained from reacting harshly to the AA’s obvious political moves, preoccupied as it is with ongoing fighting in other parts of the country that is stretching its resources thin.
The AA’s northern allies have also been using Myanmar’s post-coup turmoil to their own advantage. The United Wa State Army (UWSA), the largest non-state armed group in the Asia-Pacific region, has knowingly ignored the country’s wider suffering and shrewdly focused instead on institutionally strengthening its de facto status as a semi-independent state. On the leash of China, the UWSA has been distancing itself from the democratic and federal struggle in Myanmar, as its leaders know very well that the federal arrangement that other ethnic leaders have promoted could not guarantee its current status.
Similarly, the UWSA’s smaller southern neighbor, the National Democratic Alliance Army (NDAA), also known as the Mong La group, has also been silent on the military’s coup. In April, the junta’s peace negotiating team visited the UWSA and NDAA to explain the reasons for their coup and the current political situation, and asked them not to become involved in anti-regime resistance. The UWSA and NDAA, according to informed sources, listened to the junta, while pledging nothing. In fact, they have no stake in the anti-coup or anti-democratic movements as their main concern is to prevent the political crises and conflicts of other parts of Myanmar permeating their regions.
Other groups of the Federal Political Negotiation and Consultative Committee (FPNCC) led by the UWSA, such as the Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA), Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA) and Shan State Progressive Party/Shan State Army (SSPP/SSA-N) have been trying to consolidate their sway in northern Shan State.
The TNLA and MNDAA have engaged in sporadic fighting with the Myanmar military in northern Shan State since the coup, but the military has not reacted automatically to those attacks because its troops are overstretched elsewhere. Both the TNLA and MNDAA have exploited the uncertain situation to expand their territory in northern Shan State. The TNLA has also reportedly cooperated with the SSPP/SSA-N to drive another ethnic Shan armed group – the Restoration Council of Shan State/Shan State Army-S (RCSS/SSA-S) – out of northern Shan State.
These ethnic armed groups have received fierce criticism for fighting against each other instead of targeting the military, but the critics are not aware of the underlying political dynamics of that region. In fact, these members of the FPNCC have strategically sought to expand the territory they control and to strengthen their sway in those areas. These moves were not actually made in collaboration with the junta but are strides towards fulfilling their own political agenda. Although they rarely articulate their objectives, it seems that, based on their political moves, their political future does not lie in a “federal” arrangement.
However, FPNCC members, apart from the AA, have avoided explicitly disclosing their stances as that could draw an enormous backlash from backers of the National League for Democracy (NLD) and even from other ethnic armed groups that embrace the promise of a federal solution for Myanmar. Now, this concealment is no longer necessary as the post-coup situation has enabled them to make real progress towards their political goals.
Only the Kachin Independence Army (KIA), another member of the FPNCC, has been actively engaging in intense fighting with the military since the coup. The KIA has perhaps strategically maneuvered to recapture bases previously seized by the military, and extended its grip in Kachin State, which has triggered a brutal and lethal response from the junta.
However, based solely on the inclusion of KPICT representatives in the NUG, it is politically naïve to claim that the KIA has been fighting for the NUG or a federal future. Currently, the KIA appears to be realistically concerned with taking back control of as much territory in Kachin State as it can, while fighting against the common enemy, the military regime, instead of being dedicated to some form of future political structure.
Beyond the KIA, the federal discourse has not proved very popular, even amongst the ethnic armed groups who have signed the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA). Building up a democratic federal Union is a key vision of the NCA and signatories have been obsessive about that vision since signing the NCA. In reality, however, the NCA is invalidated in the post-coup political scenario, with the military violently imposing its dictatorial rule and with armed conflicts engulfing the whole country. Out of ten NCA signatories, some brigades of the Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA) – the armed wing of the Karen National Union (KNU) – and the Chin National Front (CNF) have resumed fighting with the military since the coup.
DPA Notes: Given the situation on the ground between all the factions and the Tatmadaw, it is unlikely that the NUG will be able to get most of these separatist groups under their wings.
All the separatist factions would likely prefer their own independent sovereign states over a federal system, especially if they are going to win that with the blood of their own soldiers.
Tatmadaw concentrated most of their firepower on Kachin Independence Army and the Karreni Army, as the Shan state factions are fighting among themselves, Arakan Army had been left alone (probably due to the low strategic/economic value of the Rakhine State) and the Chin state forces getting vanquish earlier in the conflict by July (currently regrouping with the PDF)