Shrouded in Obscurity: The Polisario Front’s Uncertain Track Record
After the Polisario congress, the situation at the Tindouf camp seemed to stabilize, with Polisario delegates resuming their normal activities and the separatist group returning to its traditional way of life. However, various unresolved issues reemerged immediately after the congress. These included external and internal problems, recognition challenges, military concerns, and opposition issues. The problems that were temporarily set aside during the congress resurfaced, impacting the unity of the Polisario.
It is worth noting that after six years as the leader of the Polisario, Brahim Ghali no longer enjoyed unanimous support and was abandoned by his former comrades, who called for an “alternative” leadership. Mohamed Ibrahim Biadillah, a trained soldier, joined a group expected to lead the movement. “Ministers” who were marginalized from the decision-making process openly criticized the dysfunctions within the Polisario apparatus. Mustapha Sidi El Bachir, the former “Minister of the Occupied Territories and the Sahrawi Diaspora,” and author of “SADR is not a State” in December 2022 in Paris, highlighted these issues.
These observations were confirmed in 2022 and early 2023 with the emergence of new crises, including the incident involving the UN Mission in Western Sahara. Armed Polisario elements obstructed a convoy of UN vehicles from accessing its Team-Site in Smara, located to the east of the “Sand Wall” constructed by the Royal Armed Forces. Morocco has not ruled out retaking the territories east of the security wall, which fall under the authority of the United Nations, if the Polisario continues to impede the free movement of UN personnel. This action threatened to reignite the war and trigger an offensive against the Polisario Front. The incident occurred on 03/29/2023.
However, the next day, under pressure from the UN to allow the passage of the UN units, Brahim Ghali reversed his decision and sent a letter. In the letter, the Polisario leader assured that the armed elements of the movement would ensure a secure passage, on an exceptional and provisional basis, for the UN elements in the liberated Saharawi territories. Brahim Ghali emphasized that the Polisario Front would take the necessary measures to facilitate the convoy’s movement into the liberated Saharawi territories in his letter to Antonio Guterres.
In conclusion, the United Nations expressed satisfaction with the resolution of the situation regarding the initially blocked UN convoy, as outlined in a confidential letter addressed to Antonio Guterres. This case posed a potential deadlock that could have led to war. The subsequent reversal and the contradictory actions within a short period indicate an uncertain policy and raise concerns about problematic command decisions. If the Polisario does not address these issues, it may face further crises in the future.
In the same context, there are attempts to deny the military failure of the Polisario. The recent passage of the MINURSO convoy to areas east of the “Mur des Sables” has allowed Polisario media to revive the idea of the “liberated territories of the Saharawi Republic,” after a nearly three-year absence. One of the media outlets affiliated with the separatist movement highlights that the United Nations acknowledged the Polisario Front’s approval for the peacekeepers’ convoy to Tifariti and M’Hairiz, which are located east of the 2,700 km-long wall dividing the Moroccan-occupied part of Western Sahara from the area controlled by the Polisario.
However, the reality is much harsher for the Separatist Front. There are several elements that undermine the notion of “liberated territories” being under their effective control. First, the choice of Algeria as the venue for the festivities commemorating the 50th anniversary of the creation of the Polisario on May 10, 1973, demonstrates the symbolic nature of their presence. This announcement was made during a press briefing by the “Prime Minister” and reported by the SPS press agency, which is affiliated with the Polisario.
Another piece of evidence comes from the testimony of Biadillah, who was dismissed by Brahim Ghali from coordinating the army in November 2021 in favor of Mohamed El Ouali Akeik. Biadillah lamented that appointments in the military and civilian hierarchies did not contribute to the emergence of an effective elite. As a trained soldier who had fought against the Royal Armed Forces, he warned about the expansion of the Moroccan Armed Forces in the so-called “liberated territories,” which are at risk of becoming mere “security belts.” These observations seriously undermine the official communication that has propagated a “war” against Morocco since November 13, 2020, with daily press releases celebrating fictional victories. In October 2021, a media outlet close to the Polisario revealed that around 5,000 people who previously resided in the “liberated territories” had been displaced to the Tindouf camps.
Lastly, from a military perspective, the Polisario Front has not achieved any significant victories since 1989, despite counting a minor raid as a victory, even though it had no impact on the overall conflict. To assess the situation objectively, one must consider the military capabilities of the Polisario. Without UAVs or equivalent resources to compete with the Moroccan army, the viability of the separatist plan becomes increasingly precarious. The conflict has been deadlocked since 1991, and the absence of meaningful military achievements further supports this assessment.
The prospects for the Polisario to achieve success through diplomacy appear bleak. According to the Center for Western Sahara Studies (CESO) at the University of Santiago de Compostela in Spain, the number of states recognizing the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic has decreased. In 2023, only 38 countries continue to maintain recognition, while 46 nations have withdrawn their recognition. Even the Polisario’s closest supporters, such as Left parties in Spain, have distanced themselves from the movement. The Socialists have decided to no longer tolerate the presence of Polisario supporters in their electoral rallies, as demonstrated by an incident on Wednesday, April 12 in Bourgos.
During a speech by the head of government to present his party’s program for the May 28 elections, a man waving the Polisario flag prompted Pedro Sanchez to interrupt his intervention, waiting for security agents to expel the individual from the venue. The expulsion was met with applause from the socialists. The Polisario media denounce these events as a betrayal, as even former allies on the left have abandoned their support. The lack of attention to the Western Sahara issue during the speech further illustrates the waning support. Morocco is beginning to gain sympathizers within the ranks of France Insoumise and NUPES, indicating a shift in alliances.
If traditional allies like Mauritania, Spain, or even France falter, the Polisario Front would be left with South Africa and a few strongholds in Africa. Since 2020, Morocco has been successful in its diplomatic efforts, surpassing the Polisario in terms of support and gradually regaining ground.
Internal revolts within the Polisario Front’s headquarters, the Tindouf camps, have also emerged. Large NGOs have previously criticized Algeria for its management of the camps, citing instances of “slavery” and other crimes. Recently, an NGO in the Canary Islands called for monitoring human rights in Tindouf, highlighting ongoing violations faced by refugees due to the camps’ remote location and legal vacuum, which the Polisario exploits to implement its own form of justice. These issues have been compounded by the revolt that occurred in early April at the “Dakhla camp,” where Sahrawis set fire to the gendarmerie premises. The Forum of support for the autonomists of Tindouf (FORSATIN) explained in a press release that this incident was an act of revenge against the ill-treatment inflicted by gendarmerie elements on Sahrawis residing in the Dakhla camp. The revolt was met with strong repression and the deployment of reinforcements from the Algerian Army.
To add to the complexity, there is a problem within the supposed identification of the Polisario, and therefore the Sahrawis themselves. Not all Sahrawis support the Polisario, and those in the Tindouf camps are even resorting to setting fires against para-military posts. The accumulation of violence and protest movements suggests a worsening situation.
In conclusion, the situation remains highly uncertain. Realistically, the establishment of an independent Western Sahara republic appears unlikely given the current conditions. The opposite scenario could unfold, with a resurgence of a frontal war where the Moroccan Army would take control of the territory with the support of Europe and nations aligned with the question of autonomy. As mentioned in the previous article, only Algeria has a slight possibility of altering the course of events, but the outcome seems predetermined. We will observe and leave the possibilities open, while planning a trip to the city of Dakhla to investigate, conduct interviews, and demystify certain rumors, as part of the Defense Politics Asia team’s agenda concerning the situation in Western Sahara.