Focus Active theater
Myanmar
Republic of the Union of Myanmar / People's Defensive War
Republic of the Union of Myanmar vs the People's Defensive War, now aiming at a Strategic Offensive. Read both sides first.
- Naypyitaw vs NUG / PDF ongoing
- Naypyitaw vs KIO / KIA bilateral talks refused
- Naypyitaw vs ULA / AA Rakhine war
- Naypyitaw vs PSLF / TNLA talks
- Naypyitaw vs ASEAN 5PC deadlock
Snapshot Snapshot frozen 17–18 August 2026. Rolling war lives in SITREPs below.
The sides
Each side in its own words, next to each other. Nothing merged.
Naypyitaw — Republic of the Union of Myanmar
Position as of 10 May 2026 + 8–9 August 2026Demands
- Treat the December 2025–January 2026 election as a free and fair mandate; the new government has assumed state responsibility
- ASEAN members must stop restrictions, discriminatory measures, and the exclusion of the Myanmar Government; no interference (ASEAN Charter Art. 2)
- Process is Myanmar-owned and Myanmar-led
- Aung San Suu Kyi: sentences commuted on humanitarian grounds; full and unconditional release shall only be carried out in accordance with the law
- No new ASEAN special envoy once the current chair's envoy term ends — no longer necessary
- Appropriate countermeasures, on a case-by-case basis, against unconstructive and discriminatory treatment (Diplomat quoting the Saturday MOFA statement)
- PDFs / EAOs: return to the legal fold / come to talks (100-day peace invitation)
Compromise
- ICRC visit allowed 3 Aug 2026 (ICRC confirmed a private meeting; findings not public)
- Sentence commutations / claimed house-arrest transfer (regime media). NUG says the transfer is unverified
- Bilateral ASEAN engagement even without consensus
Moves
- Election December 2025–January 2026; parliament elected Min Aung Hlaing president 3 April; oath 10 April 2026 (ICG / state media). They do not call themselves junta. Conflict frame: NUG, CRPH, PDFs = terrorist groups; EAOs invited back to the legal fold.
- MOFA 10 May 2026 press statement (full official English).
- MOFA Saturday statement after the 7 August 2026 ASEAN Chair statement (quoted by The Diplomat).
- 17 Aug 2026 — president leaves for Russia (Democratic Voice of Burma).
In their words
"The Republic of the Union of Myanmar successfully held a free and fair multiparty democratic general election between December 2025 and January 2026. Out of 24.23 million eligible voters nationwide, more than 13.13 million cast their votes according to their own free will. As a result, a new government led by the President elected by the Parliament, chosen by the people has now assumed the responsibilities of the State. … In the 2020 general election, the then-ruling government committed severe electoral irregularities. … significant irregularities involving over 11.3 million cases out of 38.2 million eligible voters … Therefore, a new free and fair general election was held in December 2025. … Myanmar will continue to pursue peace, stability, prosperity, and the protection of the fundamental rights and interests of the people of Myanmar through a Myanmar-owned and Myanmar-led process aligned with the country's prevailing circumstances."
... 10 May 2026. https://www.mofa.gov.mm/en/press-statement/
"Although the government has commuted her sentences based on humanitarian considerations, the matter of a full and unconditional release shall only be carried out in accordance with the law. … At present, the government, which emerged from the multiparty democratic elections reflecting the genuine will of the people, has assumed state responsibility. Therefore, Myanmar is of the view that the appointment and the continued role of the new Special Envoy of the ASEAN Chair are no longer necessary."
... Saturday after the 7 August 2026 ASEAN Chair statement. Diplomat quotation of the official statement. https://thediplomat.com/2026/08/myanmar-rejects-asean-call-for-suu-kyis-release-questions-need-for-special-envoy/
National Unity Government
Position as of 7 August 2026Demands
- No recognition of the 2025–26 election or the April 2026 presidency
- Inclusive political transition; 2020 mandate still stands (with CRPH)
- Immediate unconditional release of all political prisoners, including Aung San Suu Kyi (State Counsellor) and Win Myint (President)
- ASEAN / UN must not treat the ICRC visit as resolution of the crisis
- Military: prepare to move from People's Defensive War to Strategic Offensive; coordinate with allied EROs; sit on SCEF military coordination committee (NUG MoD, 7 Aug)
Moves
- NUG is the executive. SCEF is the coordination body (NUG + CRPH + KNU + KNPP + CNF + KIO). The EAOs keep their own columns.
- Commanders' Meeting (2/2026), 3–6 Aug; MoD announcement 7 Aug. Acting President Duwa Lashi La and PM Mann Win Khaing Than attended the last day (Mizzima / DVB reporting of the MoD release).
- Public line on the ICRC visit 5 Aug: a positive humanitarian development that fails core detention / health / family-access tests (NUG via DVB). No formal offer to Naypyitaw verified yet.
- NUG MoD, 7 August 2026: moving from People's Resistance War to a Strategic Offensive, aligned with the SCEF command structure (via @mod_nug and Mizzima). No first-person quote on record yet. https://eng.mizzima.com/2026/08/08/37242
Committee Representing Pyidaungsu Hluttaw
Position as of 16 March 2026Demands
- 2020 results remain valid
- Sham election, its parliament, and its administration have no legitimacy
- UN / governments: recognize only elected MPs, NUG, and federal democratic forces; no diplomatic relations with the terrorist military group
- Immediate unconditional release of Win Myint, Aung San Suu Kyi, all political prisoners
- Expand sanctions; EROs + NUG unity to eradicate military dictatorship and build a Federal Democratic Union
Moves
- Legislative claim. Not the NUG (NUG is the executive they recognize). 2008 Constitution already abolished by CRPH (their claim).
In their words
"As a terrorist organization that has unlawfully seized State power by force, it has absolutely no authority to hold elections. … The sham election organized by the terrorist military junta, as well as the parliament and administrative body formed through that election, do not in any way represent the will of the people and possess absolutely no legitimacy."
... Statement (1/2026), 16 March 2026. https://crphmyanmar.org/publications/statement-of-pyidaungsu-hluttaw-9th-session/
KIO / KIA
Position as of August 2026 clusterDemands
- Only comprehensive talks including all stakeholders
- Refuse separate one-on-one meetings with Naypyitaw
Moves
- Not NUG, though in SCEF with NUG. Fighting continues. They read separate talks as divide-and-rule.
In their words
"As we've always said, we will only take part in comprehensive talks that include all stakeholders. KIO will not accept invitations to meet separately with individual groups. … We will only take part in talks where all stakeholders from across the country are involved, because that is the only kind of dialogue that could lead to change across the country."
... KIO spokesperson — BNI / Network Media Group (article current in the August 2026 cluster). https://www.bnionline.net/en/news/kio-rules-out-joining-juntas-separate-talks-eaos
Map
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Conflict
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The rest
Third parties, blocs, and developments that move the board.
Position
ULA / Arakan Army
Named side, not NUG. Last official political line found: spokesperson U Khaing Thukha: ULA/AA has not called for separation yet; goal is full self-determination and a confederate system (BNI). The press-conference year could not be independently confirmed as 2026. Stated end-state in that last official line is confederation / self-determination, not NUG federal democracy. https://www.bnionline.net/en/news/ulaaa-our-policy-self-determination-and-confederation
Position
PSLF / TNLA
Named side, talking to Naypyitaw. Not NUG. Reported demand at the 19 July 2026 Naypyitaw meeting with NSPNC (Yar Pyae): formal recognition of an autonomous Ta'ang State, described by DVB as remaining an integral part of the Union of Myanmar (not secession). Tar Jok Jar: attended voluntarily and without preconditions (SHAN citing the meeting). Agenda reported by military media: 100-Day Peace Plan, ceasefire understandings, political avenues, health/education. A record of discussions was signed, but nothing verified as a ceasefire treaty. No first-person TNLA quote on record yet. https://english.dvb.no/tnla-wants-formal-recognition-of-taang-state-from-regime-in-naypyidaw/
Position
ASEAN
Chair's Statement 7 August 2026: ICRC visit a positive step towards inclusive national dialogue and reconciliation; call for Aung San Suu Kyi's complete and unconditional release; request that Special Envoy Ma. Theresa Lazaro meet her (Diplomat quoting the Chair). Five-Point Consensus remains ASEAN's official framework; Myanmar still barred from summits. Lazaro: full reintegration far off without 5PC implementation (Diplomat).
Position
ICRC
3 August 2026 private meeting with Aung San Suu Kyi per ICRC procedures; findings shared only with the detaining authorities, not the public (Mizzima / DVB).
Position
Russia
Min Aung Hlaing arrived / left for talks with Putin 17 August 2026 (DVB). Third party, not a Myanmar side. No joint communiqué on record yet.
Position
China
China is leaning on the border EAO talks. No 2026 MFA quote on record, and nothing from UWSA, NDAA, or MNDAA.
Annex: Who's who
The factions on this board, what they are, and where they stand. As of August 2026.
Myanmar is not a two-sided war. There is the state, a parallel government with its own armed wing, and more than a dozen ethnic armed organisations (EAOs), each with its own territory, goals, and deals. Some fight Naypyitaw, some talk to it, and some do both. Names below use each group's own terms.
The state
Union Government
Government- Led by
- President Min Aung Hlaing (oath 10 April 2026)
- Base
- Naypyitaw
Formed after the December 2025 to January 2026 election. Min Aung Hlaing led the February 2021 coup as commander-in-chief. The government calls the NUG, CRPH, and PDFs terrorist groups, and invites EAOs back to the legal fold.
Myanmar Armed Forces
Armed forces- Base
- Nationwide; strongest in the central cities and Naypyitaw
The national military. Lost regional commands and border towns to EAO offensives from late 2023. Relies on air power and conscription, in force since 2024.
National Solidarity and Peacemaking Negotiation Committee
Talks body- Base
- Naypyitaw
The state's channel to armed groups. Hosted the TNLA / PSLF in Naypyitaw on 19 July 2026.
The resistance government
Formed by lawmakers elected in 2020 and ousted by the coup. They treat the 2020 result as the only valid mandate.
National Unity Government
Parallel government- Led by
- Acting President Duwa Lashi La; PM Mann Win Khaing Than
- Base
- Underground, resistance-held areas, and abroad
The executive of the resistance, formed April 2021. Runs its own ministries, including a Ministry of Defence. In August 2026 it said it would move from the People's Defensive War to a Strategic Offensive.
Committee Representing Pyidaungsu Hluttaw
Legislature (claimed)Lawmakers elected in 2020, acting as the parliament. They say the 2008 Constitution is abolished and recognise the NUG as the executive.
People's Defence Force
Armed wing- Base
- Mostly the Bamar heartland: Sagaing, Magway, Mandalay
The NUG's armed wing, formed in 2021. A mix of NUG-commanded battalions and local defence forces, often fighting alongside EAOs.
Steering Council for the Emergence of a Federal Democratic Union
Coordination bodyBrings together the NUG, CRPH, KNU, KNPP, CNF, and KIO. Each member keeps its own army and its own column on this page.
Ethnic armed organisations
Most have fought the centre for decades, long before 2021. Their end goals differ: federal union, confederation, or autonomy.
Kachin Independence Organisation / Army
EAO- Base
- Kachin State; headquarters at Laiza on the China border
- Stance
- Fighting. SCEF member. Refuses one-on-one talks
One of the largest EAOs. Will only join talks that include all stakeholders.
United League of Arakan / Arakan Army
EAO- Led by
- Commander-in-chief Twan Mrat Naing
- Base
- Rakhine State and parts of Chin State
- Stance
- Fighting. Not NUG
Took most of Rakhine State after the 2023 offensive. Its stated aim is self-determination and a confederate system.
Ta'ang National Liberation Army / Palaung State Liberation Front
EAO- Base
- Northern Shan State
- Stance
- In talks with Naypyitaw
Seeks formal recognition of an autonomous Ta'ang State inside the Union. Met the NSPNC in Naypyitaw on 19 July 2026.
Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army
EAO- Base
- Kokang region, northern Shan State, on the China border
Took Laukkai in the 2023 offensive and Lashio in 2024. Handed Lashio back in 2025 under Chinese pressure.
Karen National Union / Karen National Liberation Army
EAO- Base
- Karen (Kayin) State and the Thai border
- Stance
- Fighting. SCEF member
The oldest armed group in the country, fighting since 1949. Shelters resistance fighters and displaced people along the Thai border.
Karenni National Progressive Party and allied Karenni forces
EAO- Base
- Karenni (Kayah) State
- Stance
- Fighting. SCEF member
Leads the Karenni resistance with newer post-coup forces in the same state.
Chin National Front / Chin National Army
EAO- Base
- Chin State, on the India border
- Stance
- Fighting. SCEF member
The main Chin armed group. Chin resistance is split between rival coalitions.
Restoration Council of Shan State
EAO- Base
- Southern Shan State
Signed the 2015 Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement. Largely stayed out of the post-coup war.
Shan State Progress Party
EAO- Base
- Northern Shan State
Rival of the RCSS for Shan leadership. Close to the UWSA.
Alliances and outliers
Three Brotherhood Alliance
AllianceMNDAA, TNLA, and AA. Launched Operation 1027 on 27 October 2023, the offensive that broke the military's hold on the northern border.
United Wa State Army
EAO- Base
- Wa region, eastern Shan State, on the China border
- Stance
- Ceasefire with the military since 1989
The largest non-state army in the country and the closest to Beijing. Runs its own territory and stays out of the war.
Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army
Armed group- Base
- Northern Rakhine State and the Bangladesh border camps
Rohingya armed group. Its 2016 and 2017 attacks were followed by the military clearance operations that drove Rohingya into Bangladesh. Now at odds with the Arakan Army.
Reports & video
SITREPs and analysis on this theater. The rolling war lives here.
