Soleimani: Another miscalculation on Trump’s resolve – Episode Iran

Iran had been systematically raising the stakes across the region after Trump cancelled Obama’s marquee “Iran Nuclear Deal” and imposed comprehensive sanctions on Iran.

Since then Iran had ramped up its actions abroad, with the most significant events being the seizures of foreign oil tankers in the Gulf and the “drone attack” on Saudi Arabia’s oil facilities that knocked out half of Saudi Arabia oil export output.

From my analysis, Iranian actions had been tied to the fact that they had been powerless in the comprehensive sanctions imposed by the Americans – and they had ‘conjuring mischiefs” to attract attentions of the global community, in order to garner some form of “anti-support” in order to level the playing field with Washington on the proverbial negotiating table of geopolitical balance.

Increased Iranian hostile actions in Yemen (Houthis had been relative successful against Saudi forces, with the incursion into Saudi soil in late September 2019 that wiped out an estimated 3 battalions), operations in Syria (which is met with limited success due to the lack of support from Russia and Syrian government) as well as recent confrontational stances, were exerting tremendous pressures on American allies in the region. 
Trump’s administration however had not “done much” outside of the sanctions, as Iran had not dared to touch American interests thus far.

However, this was about to change with the political turmoil in Iraq.
Iran influence on their former arch-enemy had grown significantly since the “ISIS days” and Iran had not been shy to assert their newfound influence on Iraq. A messy Iraq is definitely in the interests of Iran – and that’s what we have seen in recent months. Iraqi government had been struggling to quell major protests in recent months, as deaths mounted over multiple accusations that Iran-backed militias had been behind some of the violence/killings.

A messy Iraq is definitely in the interests of Iran

Perhaps emboldened by the success Iran had with Iraq internal situation, Iran is probably betting on using the complicated political and military landscape in Iraq to further complicate US interest in Iraq. And the last straw came when Iran-backed militias “attacked” the US embassy – the first “direct attack” on US interests – a move that Iran probably believe will discourage further US involvement in Iraq and to humiliate the Americans, “knowing” that there is little Trump’s administration could do about it in retaliation.

What would USA do, when it did not even “intervene” after they seized UK ships and attacked Saudi oil facilities? Trump did not even do anything when Iran shot down their drone!

But this turns out to be a miscalculation by Iran, much like what China and North Korea experienced in their own dealings with Trump’s America. Death rain down on Iran’s General Qasem Soleimani, the commander of the Revolutionary Guards, and self professed leader of Iranian’s foreign policy/operations in Iraq, Lebanon, Gaza and Afghanistan (which I would add Syria too), on the 3rd of January 2020. The airstrike that took out Soleimani, killed Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis, the Iraqi militia leader of the Iranian backed Kataib Hezbollah group.

“Dear General Petraeus, you should know that I, Qassem Suleimani, control the policy for Iran with respect to Iraq, Lebanon, Gaza and Afghanistan. And indeed, the ambassador in Baghdad is a Quds Force member. The individual who’s going to replace him is a Quds Force member.”  

Qasem Soleimani text message to General Petraeus when he first took over command of US Forces in the Middle East

Soleimani is perhaps the most powerful and perhaps popular “political” figure in Iranian politics despite not being in politics. He had commanded multiple operations in Syria and is probably the most influential figure in Iraqi politics given how he had spoken to top brass of the Iraqi government before his death. Given his boasting of his “decision power” of Iranian politic in the region – the killing the Soleimani by the US is definitely raising the stakes to more than a few whole new levels.

Along with the killing of Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis, the assassination of Soleimani marks Trump’s first real action against Iran. The entire gamble that the embassy protest/attack will complicate US position in an increasing pro-Iran/anti-US Iraqi government had totally backfired. Its almost like an invitation for a declaration of war by the USA to Iran – an invite that Iranian government would dare not take up – as any direct confrontation with USA would be disastrous.

This assassination also represents a threat of Trump’s willingness to take out anyone whom crossed the invisible line drawn by the US. This threat is not just a signal of intent to assert US dominance to Iran, but to every adversary and potential adversary: ranging from Iraq, to Syria, to North Korea and perhaps, even China.

The decisiveness to kill someone so popular and powerful within the Iranian world is definitely beyond Iran or any observers wildest imagination. Trump’s infamous tendency to stir the soup raised its head again, driving everyone guessing what would be “erratic” Trump’s next move. Every time someone think they caught a predictive pattern in Trump’s administration, which they could exploit – Trump would make a move that absolutely crush that hypothesis.

The decisiveness to kill someone so popular and powerful within the Iranian world is definitely beyond Iran or any observers wildest imagination.

In the aftermath of the airstrike, much of the commentators around the world had been talk about how Trump or Iran is going to go to war with this escalation – but in my opinion, as mentioned earlier, it is impossible that Iran would risk war against an opponent they have no chance of winning against. The more likelihood is for Iran to wage more unconventional attacks against US interests in the region.

But even these “weird punitive attacks” are proving to be pretty difficult to pull off. Not just that Iran had lost the guy that had been making all the decisions and pulling all the strings for Iran in the region – there is pretty few US troops sitting around in the region for them to attack and ambush as well. USA also no longer depend on the Middle East for oil, thus, there isn’t much American ships to hijack as well. And even if Iran managed to find someone to kill, Trump had shown in recent days that they will retaliate with overwhelming firepower.

The tide is now turned against Iran – the lost of a major leader and a wounded national pride, but with few “usable” options on the table – I am predicting a draw down of Iranian interventions in Iraq, Yemen and Syria; and perhaps a beginning of some form of political change in Iran thanks to the removal of a powerful man that could had perhaps been a major stumbling block for many that may have wanted Iran to walk a different path.